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Recommendations
\ Foster outreach activities to raise 
awareness and transparency
Many refugees, aid agencies and local authorities have 
no or misleading information about the livelihood 
activities being offered locally, a situation that causes 
frustration and mistrust. Fostering more exchange 
between national and local bureaus of authorities and 
aid organizations can increase transparency. Livelihood 
programmes should also extend their reach to non-
Syrian refugee groups, local communities and those 
outside of community centres to prevent resentment 
between groups.
\ Create more coordinated livelihood 
programmes
The number of beneficiaries is not an indicator of the 
quality of programmes. Short-term measures that 
try to reach large number of people, such as cash 
assistance, create dependency and cannot enhance 
sustainable livelihoods. If applied, they need to be 
embedded within long-term approaches. Different 
livelihood programmes, from vocational trainings to 
work programmes, should thus build on, rather than 
compete with, each other as well as take into account 
the existing skills of refugees.
\ Provide on-the-job, market-aligned 
and innovative livelihood trainings
Job opportunity is one of the main reasons, next 
to security and social ties, why people move to the 
southeast of Turkey. This suggests that incentives for 
employers to hire refugees should be increased. The 
way forward includes measures to build databases on 
demand and supply, to assist the development and 
implementation of business plans in collaboration with 
refugees, and to roll out market-aligned trainings. At 
least six months on-the-job trainings can, furthermore, 
establish trust between employer and employee as 
well as lead to long-term contracts that will stabilize 
the livelihoods of refugees.
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Turkey is the largest refugee1 recipient country world-
wide. In February 2017, the government of Turkey’s 
Directorate General of Migration (DGMM) estimated 
that almost 3,200,000 refugees are registered in Tur-
key, of which around 2,900,000 are Syrians. With the 
EU-Turkey deal that was signed in March 2016, Tur-
key pledges to take every Syrian who has irregularly 
migrated to Greece from Turkey. In return, Europe 
undertakes to resettle one Syrian from Turkey for 
every returnee, an arrangement known as the “one-
to-one initiative”. However, several European Union 
(EU) member states have been reluctant to accept any 
more refugees on their territory. Despite recent peace 
talks in Geneva in February and March of this year, 
the conflict in Syria shows no signs of ending soon. 
Consequently, the refugees’ chances of finding dura-
ble solutions remain slim. Besides hoping to get one 
of the few resettlement spots or finding illegal ways 
to move towards Europe, most Syrian refugees can 
only try to build a livelihood within Turkey. Yet, how 
can they sustain their livelihoods within Turkey and 
what can aid organizations do to help? 
Although the Syrian conflict is already in its sixth 
year, most international and local aid organizations 
have only very recently started livelihood program-
ming. In 2016, the livelihoods sector was the least 
funded one within the framework of the Regional 
Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).2 In the southeast 
of Turkey, international aid organizations have main-
ly focused on cross-border activities into Syria. Many 
aid organizations have assumed that Turkey will 
manage the refugee influx on its own, given that Tur-
key is a middle income country. Moreover, until 
around mid-2012 the Turkish government had placed 
restrictions on international non-governmental or-
ganizations for operations within Turkey. It is only 
since European countries had their own experience 
of large-scale refugee flows in the autumn of 2015, 
and the Balkan route was closed in March 2016 
1 \ I use the term “refugee” here, although Turkey itself does not consid-
er Syrians “refugees” because of the geographical limitation to the 
Refugee Convention. See further down.
2 \ “A regionally coordinated plan composed of country chapters devel-
oped under the leadership of national authorities with support from 
the United Nations and NGOs in each country” (UNHCR, 2017).
leaving refugees stranded at its borders, that the EU 
has been paying more attention to how refugees in 
neighbouring states, like Turkey, of countries in con-
flict can be assisted. Ultimately, the aim of the EU is 
to prevent further movement towards Europe. 
Against the backdrop of rising incidents of human 
rights violations within Turkey (Human Rights 
Watch, 2017) and the Turkish constitutional referen-
dum in April 2017, EU member states have now start-
ed asking more questions about the livelihood situa-
tion of refugees within Turkey. 
This Policy Brief presents ways of enhancing liveli-
hood programming in Turkey in order to foster 
self-reliance of refugees and sustain their liveli-
hoods.3 Access to sustainable livelihoods for refugees 
is essential to mitigate the risk of impoverishment, 
prevent protracted poverty and avoid renewed dis-
placement of refugees.4 The Policy Brief is based on 
preliminary findings of the author’s field research 
over a two-month period in the autumn and winter 
of 2016. It focuses on Gaziantep and Hatay in the 
 southeast of Turkey as most refugees live there.  
This research is embedded in the framework of the 
project “Protected rather than Protracted: Strength-
ening Refugees and Peace”, funded by the German 
Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). The author undertook around 30 expert inter-
views from 22 different international organizations 
(IOs) and NGOs.  In addition, 17 semi-structured in-
depth narrative interviews, mainly with impover-
ished5 Syrian individuals living in urban surround-
ings, were conducted to identify their livelihood 
perspectives and coping strategies, as well as to ana-
lyse their relationship with local communities.6 Over 
90 per cent of refugees in Turkey live outside camps. 
3 \ “A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required 
for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable which can cope with 
and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabili-
ties and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for 
the next generation” (Chambers, R., & Conway, G.R, 1991). 
4 \ For the risks of impoverishment, see Cernea, M. M. 2000. 
5 \ There are, of course, also Syrians that are not impoverished and 
self-reliant, but they are not the focus of this study.
6 \ My thanks go to the respondents and translators who helped to facili-
tate the interviews and to the organizations that provided access to 
their projects or assisted with contacts.
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Sustainable livelihoods need
 approaches that go beyond temporary
measures
While the government of Turkey and the largest
Turkish humanitarian organization, the Turkish Red
Crescent, have been very engaged in assisting Syrians
in the last few years,7 several refugees reported in
 November 2016 that they felt ignored by them and by
other aid organizations. At the beginning of the Syri-
an conflict in 2011, Turkey welcomed refugees with an
open-door policy. Yet since November 2015, it has
largely closed its border to Syria and even half-fin-
ished a project to build a wall. Turkey has also main-
tained that a geographical limitation applies to the
1951 Refugee Convention so that Syrians should not
be considered as refugees; rather, because they did
not flee from Europe, they are to be referred to as
“guests”. This approach hinders long-term solutions,
such as local integration. Although Syrians were
granted “temporary protection” status with the intro-
duction of the Law on Foreigners and International
Protection (LFIP) in 2014, the very title of “temporary”
demonstrates that their stay is treated and thought of
as only temporary. There seems to be no interest in
putting long-term strategies in place. This is also
 reflected in the livelihood programming of local, but
also international actors, towards refugees, which
 directly influences their livelihood situation. While
international donors have increased their aid, it does
not seem to be effective to the extent that it fails to
reach all groups and is not, for the most part, aligned
to long-term strategies. Without the latter, however,
refugees will be forced to move again and will stay
impoverished, for they will not have any additional
assets or be able to rely on social networks for
assistance.
The short-term approach of several aid organization
is reflected in the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN),
a cash card programme that was launched in Novem-
ber 2016. Funded by the EU with a grant of 348 million
7 \ The government of Turkey stated in October 2016 that it had spent 
over US $12 billion on assistance to Syrians since the beginning of the 
crisis (UNHCR, 2017a).
euros, the programme is implemented by the World 
Food Programme (WFP) and the Turkish Red  Crescent 
(Kizilay) in collaboration with the Turkish Ministry of 
Family and Social Policy and the Disaster and Emer-
gency Management Presidency (AFAD). This pro-
gramme does partly empower refugees as they can 
freely decide how to spend their money. It envisages 
targeting 20,000 Syrian families by mid-2017, which is 
said to be the equivalent of one million individuals. 
However, the ESSN also creates dependencies and 
does not generate sustainable livelihoods. Although 
the card is topped up monthly with 100 Turkish lira 
(TRY) (around 26 euros in March 2017), it is not even 
enough to pay rent and will run out in a couple of 
months if funding is not extended. Syrian refugees in 
Gaziantep paid, for example, for a simple single-room 
apartment alone around 300 TRY, a sum which does 
not yet include heating costs. This shortfall forces 
several families to live together without any privacy. 
Due to high demand in housing, landlords can often 
demand exorbitant rents, as reported by many Syri-
ans as well as NGO and IO officers. Moreover, while 
one million refugees are targeted by the fund, at least 
two million are not, a situation that creates tensions 
between recipients and non-recipients. 
Several Syrian refugees stated that they were strug-
gling to survive with no regular or short-term income 
and were not at all equipped for any “shocks” as they 
cannot save any money. Yet for livelihoods to be sus-
tainable, they need to be resistant to shocks or other-
wise risk impoverishment. Refugees are thus forced 
to move to find other livelihood opportunities some-
where else, despite their strong desire for stability af-
ter unsettling or even traumatic past experiences 
within Syria.  Although cash assistance might stimu-
late the local market, cash assistance can only tempo-
rarily alleviate the livelihood situation of refugees. 
Short-term measures alone cannot be the solution for 
enhancing the livelihoods of refugees. They need to 
be embedded in and complemented by long-term ap-
proaches to be effective.
Another issue is that, within the ESSN, refugees with 
work permits are not eligible for cash assistance. Syr-
ian refugees have, since January 2016, officially been 
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too short and rigid for many refugees to attend. More-
over, the shortage of child care places prevents wom-
en from attending vocational trainings. But even 
those refugees who completed vocational trainings 
were not necessarily able to find a regular job after-
wards or, indeed, any job at all.  Even though interna-
tional and local aid organizations steadily try to in-
crease their number of “beneficiaries”, too little 
emphasis is placed on the quality of livelihood pro-
grammes, such as vocational trainings. There is insuf-
ficient planning and assessments up front, and a lack 
of programme evaluations and follow-ups afterwards. 
The trainings on offer do not necessarily fit the local 
market. Market assessments are thus crucial compo-
nents of livelihood programming. A good example of 
how this can be done was the case of training in us-
ing a software programme required by a firm which 
ended with a refugee getting the job. However, basic 
techniques on mobile phone usage that were taught 
in some community centres were considered by some 
interviewees not to be enough to keep up with the 
ever changing and competing market. Trainings also 
need to include more diverse and innovative ap-
proaches that fit with and foster the local market as 
well as build on the existing skills of refugees. A way 
forward is a multi-phase livelihood approach being 
implemented by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) in 
Hatay. A strong focus is placed first on identifying the 
existing skills and priorities of refugees through live-
lihood counselling so that they can then be presented 
with options for developing and transferring skills. 
Follow-up trainings and job placements will come 
next. Unfortunately, many of the trainings offered by 
aid agencies do not have these follow-up components, 
making it difficult for refugees, even those with ex-
tensive skills, to find a job because they may not have 
the contacts to Turkish employers or know about job 
offers. 
A further problem is that Turkish employers often 
lack the incentive to hire Syrians or even do not  
know about the availability of qualified staff. Data-
bases of the refugees’ skills and the job opportunities 
need to be developed and upgraded so that both sides, 
demand and supply, can find each other. While job 
fairs have been organized by aid organizations and 
able to work through the introduction of the Regula-
tion on the Work Permit of Foreigners under Tempo-
rary Protection by the Turkish government. Although 
they should be paid at least the minimum wage, 
 Syrian refugees are paid often much less than their 
Turkish co-workers  with similar qualifications and 
therefore also cannot sustain their livelihoods. As a 
29-year-old Syrian man reported, he feels “exploited 
like a slave”. To increase their income, some refugees 
therefore turn to negative coping strategies such as 
child labour or early marriage as one salary alone is 
not sufficient. Yet finding any regular and stable jobs 
is currently very difficult in Turkey, particularly as 
the unemployment rate rose to 12.01 per cent by No-
vember 2016. Among young people, it is even higher. 
As one NGO worker states: “Trading with Syria has 
stopped, tourism has stopped and thus, income to the 
city is low and there are few job opportunities”. Inter-
viewees therefore mentioned job opportunity as one 
of the primary reasons for moving within Turkey, 
along with security concerns and social ties. Yet 
 Syrian refugees can only apply for a work permit six 
months after their registration and in the city they 
first registered. Indeed, registration has been delayed 
or even stopped since the autumn of 2016, as several 
interviewees reported, leaving Syrian refugees with 
waits before they can officially work even if their ID 
card was issued on time. So refugees are seeking jobs 
in the informal sector, which makes them even more 
susceptible to exploitation, including excessive work-
ing hours of eleven hours a day. 
Livelihood programmes should be 
interconnected and based on local 
market needs 
The long and irregular working hours were cited by 
refugees as a reason why they are not able to take part 
in language courses or vocational activities. They 
simply have no time and energy left. Yet, the lack of 
language and other skills is often a barrier to finding 
a more secure job. There are community centres for 
refugees within city neighbourhoods that are run by 
international aid organizations and offer language 
and vocational trainings, including accounting, mar-
keting or hairdressing, but their opening hours are 
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Foster outreach activities and 
coordination to prevent 
misinformation and mistrust 
Many refugees are, furthermore, not even reached by 
livelihood programmes. Several refugees interviewed 
did not even know about the community centres or 
courses offered because aid organizations have not 
conducted any outreach activities or cut back on such 
activities. Moreover, some refugees said they felt hesi-
tant to leave their apartment because of traumatic 
experiences in the past. An elderly Syrian woman, for 
example, stated that she does not like to interact with 
others and thus rarely goes outside. Consequently, not 
all information reaches her and other refugees. In ad-
dition, assessments on livelihoods are mostly con-
ducted with refugees already benefitting from pro-
grammes within community, but this might not 
necessarily reflect the situation of the wider refugee 
community. While outreach activities have been re-
stricted lately by local government officials, reflecting 
the government’s mistrust towards aid organizations, 
programmes can only be effective by including all the 
different refugee groups and thus mitigating ten-
sions among them. For example, confused by the lack 
of information and transparency, some refugees did 
not understand why some received assistance and 
others did not. The prominent focus of aid agencies 
on Syrian refugees has also created a feeling of ne-
glect among other refugee groups such as Afghans 
and among poorer Turkish communities.  
The problem of missing information and misinforma-
tion has directly affected the livelihood situation of 
refugees and local communities. Due to the fact that 
policies have been constantly changing, especially in 
the last few months, some refugees, as well as local 
and international actors, felt confused as to what cur-
rent practice is in place. Some interviewees could not 
identify any “clear regulation” or strategy, particularly 
as practices differ from one municipality to the next. 
In addition, interviewees felt that, in practice, there is 
a discrepancy between what has been said and what 
is done. While Turkey has created and tasked new in-
stitutions, such as AFAD and DGMM, to manage the 
enormous influx of people since 2013, the structures 
some Turkish employers expressed a wish to hire ref-
ugees, in practice Turkish employers often fail to 
show up at the job fairs or do not hire refugees out of 
fear of being publicly shamed by their Turkish friends 
or the Turkish public. Databases should thus be anon-
ymous, trust must be built between groups and in-
centives strengthened for Turkish employers. A way 
forward is to provide on-the-job training for at least 
six months. Such schemes can, first, offer “hands on” 
training, second, establish trust between employer 
and employee and, third, lead to more long-term em-
ployment contracts with refugees. Effective incen-
tives have occurred in cases where an aid organiza-
tion pays the first few months a refugee’s salary while 
the employer has to hire the refugee for at least a year. 
There are also some equally promising examples of 
good practice: the IOM’s in-kind grant programme, 
which builds on existing skills and the entrepreneur-
ship of refugees; and a local NGO’s continuously 
adaptive approach based on discussions with the ref-
ugees on how trainings can be improved after each 
term; and those livelihood programmes in which 
business plans are discussed and developed together 
with refugees. Nevertheless, most livelihood pro-
grammes still do not embed their trainings within 
larger job placement programs. They are not inter-
connected but, rather, compete with each other; 
sometimes programmes by the same donor even 
compete. It is also found that many aid organizations 
do not engage with refugees and local communities 
when designing or seeking to improve programmes. 
Refugees are often still seen only as “recipients”, as 
the term “beneficiary” demonstrates. Organizations 
must realise that refugees can be active agents who 
can help construct programmes and become 
entrepreneurs.
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are still new and seem, in the opinion of local experts, 
overwhelmed. Because of the coup attempt in July 
2016, the system has been heavily shaken, with Turk-
ish agencies appearing to be “busy with themselves”. 
Registration procedures have thus been delayed, irreg-
ular and, in some cases, even stopped, leading to frus-
trations among refugees and creating resentment 
 towards Turkish agencies. Some refugees said the 
agencies “do not care” and “make rules that exploit 
Syrians and make their life difficult”. Only if refugees 
are registered can they access services.  
Consequently, transparency on current policy and 
practice is essential to reduce frustration levels and 
promote awareness among refugees of their liveli-
hood opportunities, such as access to courses and jobs 
and the procedures for registration and work permits. 
Although aid organizations themselves cannot influ-
ence the fluctuation of Turkish policies, they can try 
to cooperate more closely with local authorities in 
 order to increase information sharing and build trust. 
A positive example was found in the case of a com-
munity information centre that puts information 
sharing at the forefront of its work and disseminates 
information on policy changes and livelihood pro-
grammes available to refugees and local communi-
ties. However, several aid organizations stated that 
cooperation with national and local authorities was 
difficult because staff had recently changed, access 
was limited and mistrust was strong on both sides, 
especially after the coup attempt. Yet, it is only 
through cooperation and transparency that misinfor-
mation and mistrust can be reduced. While aid or-
ganizations have developed closer cooperation with 
the Ministry of Labour and Chamber of Commerce, 
there is still a lack of consultation with the Ministry 
of Development, despite the common interests af-
firmed by local NGO workers. Moreover, recent ser-
vice-mapping workshops by some aid organizations 
demonstrate that many agencies do not even know 
what the others are doing. Generally, more exchange 
between the authorities and aid organizations at na-
tional and local level would help to decrease misin-
formation and increase transparency, which would 
ultimately reduce resentment on all sides, ease ten-
sions and advance livelihood programming. 
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